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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background
After the Mexican Peso Crisis1 in 1994 and the Barings Crisis2 in
1995, economists and regulators examined the events that led to
these crises in an attempt to prevent further systemic economic
failures. The analysis of these past crises continued even as the
Asian Crisis3 of the late 1990s was unfolding. In the wake of the
Asian Crisis, reformers called for a New International Financial
Architecture.
As national economies continue to grow increasingly interde-
pendent, as advances in technology and communications make in-
ternational transactions even more efficient and profitable, and as
the global economy further ties the economic fates of our nations
together, we become ever more susceptible to the systemic instabil-
ity that reformers fear.
The primary concerns of those reformers are the lack of a single
set of rules or standards, and the lack of a central body to oversee
and enforce standards, in the international marketplace. Often re-
* University of Pennsylvania Law School, J.D. Candidate May 2003. I would
like to thank Professor Friedrich Kubler, whose course on international finance
inspired the idea for this Comment. I'd also like to thank my family and friends
for their support; and all of the members of the Journal of International Economic
Law at the University of Pennsylvania for their hard work on this Comment.
I For a detailed description of the events that led to the crisis, see HAL S.
SCoTr & PHILIP A. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND
REGULATION 1257-59 (8th ed. 2001) [hereinafter SCOTT & WELLONS]. See also infra §
3.3.
2 SCOTT & WELLONS, supra note 1, at 985. See also infra § 3.2.
3 SCOTT & WELLONS, supra note 1, at 1293. See also infra § 3.4.
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ferred to as the "control gap,"4 the multitude of varying financial
regulations from market to market creates uncertainty among
market players, which can quickly lead to panic from investors,
and a massive withdrawal of funds from a market or a geographic
region, sending shockwaves throughout the interconnected global
economy.5
1.2. The Current Approach
The current approach to international financial regulation is
one in which bodies of international standards such as the Basle
Committee on Banking Supervision ("Basle Committee"), the In-
ternational Organization of Securities Commissions ("IOSCO"),
and the International Association of Insurance Advisors ("IAIS")
create suggested voluntary minimum standards of practice. The
adoption of these suggested standards is then left up to each na-
tion's central bank or regulating institutions.6 Further support for
the current financial architecture is provided by the Group of
Seven ("G7"), the Group of Ten ("G10"), the International Mone-
tary Fund ("IMF"), and the World Bank, who provide monitoring,
communication, and organizational functions.7
1.3. Possible Solutions
While the call for reform of the current system is nearly unani-
mous, the potential plans for reform are quite varied, hence the
"best way to fix the system" is still open for debate. Huw Evans
describes reformers as falling into three basic camps along a spec-
trum: at one end are the market purists, 8 who believe that attempts
4 See George Walker, A New International Architecture and the Financial Stability
Forum, in THE REFORM OF THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE 119, 146
(Rosa M. Lastra ed., 2001).
5 As has often been the case in recent financial crises, in the Mexican Peso
Crisis a panic from foreign investors led to a complete cessation in new foreign
investment and a massive withdrawal of foreign funds in Mexico, exacerbating
and extending the crisis. See SCOTr & WELLONS, supra note 1, at 1288.
6 For a more in-depth description of the current system of international fi-
nancial regulation, see Huw Evans, An International Financial Regulator?, in THE
REFORM OF THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE 107 (Rosa M. Lastra ed.,
2001).
7 See Joseph J. Norton, Pondering the Parameters of the 'New International Finan-
cial Architecture': A Legal Perspective, in THE REFORM OF THE INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE 3,4546 (Rosa M. Lastra ed., 2001).
8 Evans, supra note 6, at 110.
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at international regulation have proven to be failures and that in-
stead, everything should be left to the forces of the market; in the
middle of the spectrum are the pragmatists,9 or the so-called 'gap-
fillers,' who the see the current architecture as successful, and who
only want to continue to try to fill in the gaps between regulating
standards and regulating bodies (the majority of reformers fall into
this group); on the far end of the spectrum are the visionaries, who
believe that it is both possible and desirable to set up a new world
financial authority.' 0
Most reformers, and much of the academic and economic
communities that are given a forum in which to voice their opin-
ion, believe that it is impractical or impossible to create a single
central authority to promulgate, regulate, and enforce standards
for the international marketplace." The purpose of this Comment
is to argue otherwise.
1.4. Comment Outline
In an attempt to understand the potential problems that are ex-
posed by our global economy and the lack of a single set of over-
arching regulations to govern the international marketplace, this
Comment will engage in brief case studies of four international fi-
nancial crises that illustrate these potential dangers. This Com-
ment will also present a possible solution to the problems posed by
the evolving international financial marketplace, in the form of the
recently established Financial Stability Forum.
Section 2 of this Comment will briefly introduce the Financial
Stability Forum -its stated purpose, its goals, and its structure.
Section 3 of this Comment will examine four past international
financial crises that may have been prevented or otherwise re-
duced in impact by the work of the Financial Stability Forum: the
Bank of Commerce and Credit International ("BCCI") Banking Col-
lapse of the early 1990s, the Barings Crisis of 1995, the Mexican
Peso Crisis of 1994-1995, and the Asian Crisis of the late 1990s.
9 See id. (describing further the pragmatists along his spectrum of reformers).
10 See id. (describing the theoretical goals and ideas of the visionary-minded
reformers).
11 See, e.g., id. at 115-16.
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Section 4 of this Comment will revisit the Financial Stability Fo-
rum, engaging in a more searching analysis of the Forum.12 The
Forum represents a step forward in the thought process on interna-
tional financial regulation. Rather than creating yet another inter-
national body in an attempt to review or propose regulation in a
very specific subject area, the Financial Stability Forum is essen-
tially a forum meant to bring together the vast array of existing
bodies and regulatory groups so as to provide a vehicle of interna-
tional communication and exchange regarding financial regula-
tion.13
In examining the Financial Stability Forum, this Comment will
analyze its creation, its intended purpose, its membership policies
and procedures, and the results of a few of the early reports and
working groups commissioned by the Forum.
Section 4 will also argue that while the Financial Stability Fo-
rum is a step in the right direction, there are reasons to believe that
the current structure of the Forum will in fact prevent the Forum
from achieving the very goals it was commissioned to perform.
Unless the key issues of expanded membership and widened par-
ticipation are addressed, there is little doubt that the ability of the
Financial Stability Forum to create a truly international financial
architecture will be compromised.
In examining these potential pitfalls of the Financial Stability
Forum, it will become evident that many of the reformers who
claim that a single global financial authority is impossible or im-
practical are in fact the same parties who stand to lose the most in
terms of current economic position and current relative power over
the international financial architecture if a single global financial
authority is achieved.
2. FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
The Financial Stability Forum was created by the G7 in re-
sponse to a perceived growing instability in the international mar-
ketplace. As technology and communications advances have
brought national economies together in an increasingly intercon-
12 For general information on the founding, goals, and structure of the Finan-
cial Stability Forum, see the Financial Stability Forum website, at
http://www.fsforum.org.
13 Ralph C. Bryant, Standards and Prudential Oversight for an Integrating World
Financial System, in ESSAYS ON THE WORLD ECONOMY AND ITS FINANCIAL SYSTEM 218,
253 (Brigitte Granville ed., 2000).
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nected "global economy,"14 those national economies have become
exposed to the risks of systemic instability. These national econo-
mies often have their economic fates tied to one another, such that
a collapse or crisis in one nation can quickly spread to others
throughout a geographic region, like dominoes.
The Financial Stability Forum was convened in April 1999, "to
promote international financial stability through information ex-
change and international cooperation in financial supervision and
surveillance." 5
The group is made up of national authorities responsible for fi-
nancial stability in significant international financial centers (treas-
uries, central banks, and supervisory agencies); sector-specific in-
ternational groupings of regulators and supervisors engaged in
developing standards and codes of good practice; international fi-
nancial institutions charged with surveillance of domestic and in-
ternational financial systems, and monitoring and fostering im-
plementation of standards; and committees of central bank experts
concerned with market infrastructure and functioning.
16
Currently, national membership in the Financial Stability Fo-
rum is limited to Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong,
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and
the United States.17 The Forum is scheduled to meet twice per
year, or "as often as needed to carry out its functions."' 8
3. FOUR INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CRISES
Perhaps the best way to understand the potential significance
of a group like the Financial Stability Forum is to look at the dan-
gers that it hopes to curb and prevent. In that vein, this section of
the paper will briefly investigate four international financial crises
that illustrate the growing interdependence, and subsequent grow-
14 See generally, id. (describing the increasingly global marketplace and pro-
viding examples of its growing interdependence).
15 Financial Stability Forum (describing the commissioning of the Financial
Stability Forum and its mandated goals and purposes), at http://
www.fsforum.org/home/home.html (last visited May 2,2003).
16 Id. at http://www.fsforum.org/About/Home.html [hereinafter Financial
Stability Forum, Home] (last visited Jan. 11, 2002) (on file with author).
17 Id. at http://www.fsforum.org/About/Membership.html (last visited Jan.
11, 2002) [hereinafter Financial Stability Forum, Membership] (on file with au-
thor).
Is Id. at http://www.fsforum.org/About/Objectives.html [hereinafter Finan-
cial Stability Forum, Objectives] (last visited Jan. 11, 2002) (on file with author).
2003]
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ing systemic risk, that accompany our increasingly "global econ-
omy.
3.1. The BCCI Banking Collapse
The failure of the BCCI in 1991 illustrates the difficulty of regu-
lating, monitoring, and enforcing basic minimum safety standards
in an international context where differing rules, lax oversight, and
biased (non)enforcement can create failures and systemic risk.
In the case of BCCI, the regulatory problems and resulting fail-
ure occurred in the international banking field. It is important to
note in this context that much of the difficulty in regulating the "in-
ternational financial architecture" stems from the variety of indus-
tries and financial instruments that currently make up the interna-
tional market. Not only is it crucial to find a way to regulate
international banking, but there is also a need to regulate securities
firms and insurance firms as well. Furthermore, new types of fi-
nancial instruments are being introduced all the time, many of
which are hard to categorize for regulatory purposes. For exam-
ple, the markets for derivatives 9 and swaps2 are relatively recent
fixtures in the international financial markets.
In regulating international banking activity, the main objective
of regulation is to avoid systemic risk.21 In our current interna-
tional system, it is generally left to the host country (the country
19 A derivative security is a financial asset that represents a claim to another
underlying financial asset. For a more complete description and understanding of
derivative securities and the derivatives markets, see STEPHEN A. Ross ET AL.,
FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE FINANCE 713 (3d ed., 1995).
20 A swap contract is an agreement between two parties to exchange or swap
specified cash flows at specified intervals. For a better understanding of how
swap contracts may be used as hedging instruments, see id. at 729.
21 In the banking context, systemic risk involves a chain reaction of bank fail-
ures that usually occur for three reasons. First is the risk that a bank failure will
leave the failing bank unable to fulfill its debt requirements through net settle-
ment systems to other banks at the end of a trading day, which may in turn leave
those creditor banks unable to fulfill their own outstanding obligations. Second is
the risk that the failing bank may have substantial deposits on record with other
banks, which can find themselves holding worthless accounts from the failing
bank. Third, there is the risk of bank runs, in which case individual investors can
hear news of the bank failure, panic, and then run to the bank where they have
their own deposits, demanding to withdraw their money for fear of losing it to a
bank failure. As one can see, these types of risks apply to both domestic and in-
ternational bank failures, and can cause great disruption and losses in the global
economy. For more detail on the systemic risks involved in international banking,
see ScOT & WELLONS, supra note 1, at 110.
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that hosts the branch or subsidiary of a foreign bank) to prevent
bank collapses. In order to understand the regulating scheme, it is
important to first understand one basic, yet very important, differ-
ence between host country regulation of foreign branches as op-
posed to foreign subsidiaries. 22
In the case of foreign subsidiaries, the subsidiary must usually
be sponsored or chartered by the host country in a manner such
that the subsidiary acts as a separate entity, and not as 'part and
parcel' of the foreign bank. In these subsidiary arrangements, the
foreign subsidiary is usually subject to the same banking rules and
regulations as domestic banks. This way, the regulatory duties be-
long mostly to the host country, and this allows the host country to
control its own risk by promulgating standards that it believes are
necessary to protect its own interests.23
When the foreign bank is set up as a branch, on the other hand,
the duties of regulation and monitoring normally belong to the
home country (the foreign country where the parent bank is lo-
cated) 24 When a foreign bank acts as a branch in the host country,
the branch operates as 'part and parcel' of the foreign parent bank.
This situation presents numerous difficulties for the host country,
the most dangerous of which is the possibility that the foreign par-
ent bank will go bankrupt. If failure of the foreign banking parent
occurs, the host country branches are also bankrupt, as the branch
operates as 'part and parcel,' and with the same funds, as the par-
ent institution. If the same foreign bank has been operating as a
subsidiary in the host country, then that subsidiary (because it is a
separate entity) operates with its own separate monetary reserves.
A foreign subsidiary in a host country can normally continue to
operate in its regular fashion even if the foreign parent banking in-
stitution has gone bankrupt in the home country.25
22 The regulation scheme regarding foreign branches versus foreign subsidi-
aries discussed here applies to the United States regulatory scheme, and is also the
scheme in many other industrialized nations, though there is no internationally
accepted standard. Id. at 111.
23 See MAXIMILIAN J.B. HALL, BANKING REGULATION AND SUPERVISION: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE UK, USA AND JAPAN 62-64 (1993) (describing the dif-
ferent approaches that three U.S. federal agencies have taken in regulating na-
tibnal banks and the theoretical rationale for each approach).
24 See SCOTT & WELLONS, supra note 1, at 111-13 (discussing why this form of
home country regulation is seen as most effective under these circumstances).
25 See HALL, supra note 23, at 75-78 (assessing a U.S. Treasury Department re-
form package for improving the regulation and supervision of the U.S. banking
system).
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This brings us to the organizational structure utilized by BCCI.
BCCI Holdings, a Luxembourg holding company, was the entity
on top of the corporate pyramid. BCCI Holdings owned two prin-
cipal banks: BCCI S.A., which had been incorporated in Luxem-
bourg, and BCC Overseas, which had been incorporated in the
Cayman Islands. 26 These two banks had subsidiaries and foreign
branches in various countries around the world. For example, the
Luxembourg bank had over twenty branches in the United King-
dom, as well as a subsidiary in Canada.27
This organizational structure led to a situation where there
were two foreign bank parents for the numerous subsidiaries and
branches around the world. Additionally, neither of the two
banks' carried out principal operations in their country of incorpo-
ration, Luxembourg or the Cayman Islands.28 Under these circum-
stances, two countries, instead of one, were responsible for moni-
toring and maintaining the safety and soundness of the banking
organization as a whole.
As often happens when multiple parties have the responsibility
for monitoring or regulating others, neither party is ultimately held
accountable for the end result, and thus the regulation is weak or
unsuccessful. "Further, since the principal operations of the bank-
ing organization were in neither country, the supervisors in these
countries had a limited ability to make judgments about the safety
and soundness of their two banks." 29
Neither Luxembourg nor the Cayman Islands were able to ef-
fectively monitor the safety and soundness of their financial insti-
tutions, leading ultimately to the collapse of BCCI. When the par-
ent institution collapsed, the financial loss was spread throughout
the international economy via the numerous bank branches that
had been operating in host countries around the globe.30
How might this collapse have been avoided? Scott & Wellons
offer a possible solution for future reference:
26 See SCOTT & WELLONS, supra note 1, at 113 (describing in detail the complex
set-up of this international banking institution).
27 Id.
28 See id. at 113-14 (discussing further the regulatory difficulties created by
this kind of international institution).
29 Id. at 114.
30 Id. at 113-14.
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In principle, this problem might have been cured if Luxem-
bourg had authority to regulate the entire operations of the
bank holding company, BCCI Holdings, but this was not
the case. The problem might also have been cured if there
had been an international agreement that there could only
be one ultimate bank parent, that is, that one of the banks
had to become a subsidiary of the other, but this was also
not the case.31
In the wake of the BCCI collapse, there was call for a change or
bolstering of international banking standards so as to avoid any
possible future reoccurrences. 32 And, in fact, there were some reac-
tive changes made to the existing (voluntary) international banking
standards by the Basle Committee,33 as well as the 'post-BCCI Di-
rective' promulgated by the EU.34
Even with these changes though, the problems have not been
completely eradicated. First, the Basle Committee's minimum
standards for international banking continue to exist solely as sug-
gestions to be voluntarily adopted or neglected by individual
countries. Second, the 'post-BCCI Directive' of the EU applies only
to those countries in the EU, and the usefulness of the regulatory
standards (however debatable) do not extend any further than that.
Third, the updated Basle Committee standards still call for interna-
tional banks to be supervised by a home-country authority "that
capably performs consolidated supervision."35 Therefore, "[gliven
that there are such large differences in the quality of supervision
among different countries... , the effectiveness of the new guide-
lines depends on the ability of national authorities to monitor each
others' [sic] quality of supervision."36
31 Id. at 114.
32 See Antonio S~inz de Vicufta, The ESCB and its Role in Banking Supervision,
in THE REFORM OF THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE 313, 315 (Rosa M.
Lastra ed., 2001) (discussing the "reactive" character of prudential rules).
33 See STEPHANY GRIFFrrH-JONEs, GLOBAL CAPITAL FLOWS: SHOULD THEY BE
REGULATED? 162-164 (1998) (providing examples of some of the reactive changes
and recommendations by the Basle Committee).
34 See Sinz de Vicufta, supra note 32, at 315-16 (discussing some of the Euro-
pean Union policy reactions in the form of alterations to the post-Bank of Com-
mercial Credit International Directive).
35 GRIFFITH-JONES, supra note 33, at 163.
36 Id.
2003]
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Again, it seems that host countries are subject to the home
countries' monitoring and enforcement in order to avoid bank fail-
ures and systemic risk. The only real change here seems to be an
increased awareness that host countries may want to make sure
that the home countries are being diligent in their regulatory roles.
Perhaps sensing the inherent weaknesses in this sort of regulatory
scheme, the U.S. Comptroller of Currency suggested in 1991 that if
the Basle Committee's approach was not effective in providing for
the safety and soundness of banking institutions, then "there may
eventually be pressure for the International Monetary Fund to conduct
formal supervisory reviews as part of its country surveillance proce-
dures."37
3.2. The Barings Crisis
The events that took place during the Barings Crisis exemplify
the difficulties of international financial regulation when the regu-
latory authority is divided among several regulating bodies. Bar-
ings was a financial group based in London that had over 100 sub-
sidiaries in multiple countries. Baring business was divided into
five separate units: banking, equity brokering and trading, corpo-
rate finance, international finance, and operations.3 Supervision
and regulation of the key Baring units was split among the regulat-
ing bodies of several different countries.
The Barings scandal involved the unauthorized trading of a
Baring employee, Nicholas Leeson, on the Singapore International
Monetary Exchange ("SIMEX") and the Osaka Stock Exchange
("OSE"). The trouble began when Leeson was chosen to head the
settlement unit of the Baring Futures Division in Singapore.
Leeson had been denied a broker's license in the United Kingdom
because of a fraudulent application, but this denial was never re-
vealed to the authorities in Singapore when he applied for, and re-
ceived, his license there in 1992.39
37 Id. (emphasis in original).
38 See SCOTT & WELLONS, supra note 1, at 987-88 (discussing Leeson's back-
ground in trading and the evolution of his increasing responsibilities with Bar-
ings).
39 Id. at 988 (detailing Leeson's involvement in futures arbitrage on the Tokyo
Stock Exchange and the Osaka Stock Exchange).
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Leeson had never before been involved in the trading of fu-
tures contracts;40 nonetheless, he quickly began engaging in futures
transactions upon his arrival in Singapore. Many of the other Bar-
ings divisions carried out financial transactions on SIMEX through
Leeson and his Singapore Division. The underpinnings of the cri-
sis began when Leeson opened a secret account on SIMEX, and be-
gan to make a great number of unauthorized trades.
Leeson lost huge sums of money in these transactions, and he
was able to hide the losses from his superiors both in Singapore
and in London. Leeson had disabled the computer link between
his trading system in Singapore and the London computer system
so that his trades would not be picked up as irregularities by the
system. In later investigations into how Leeson's activities were
not detected, the Senior Barings Managers in Singapore said they
"viewed BFS [Leeson's Singapore Division] as Mr [sic] Leeson's
own responsibility and thus did not check Mr [sic] Leeson's activi-
ties. On the other hand, the Baring Group management in London
maintained that BFS was a Singapore company accountable in the
first instance to its local managers." 41
By the time the collapse occurred in 1995, Leeson had lost $2.2
billion42 through his unauthorized trading activities. The unau-
thorized dealing went on for over two years, during which time his
activities were never discovered. While auditors in Singapore
failed to recognize or prevent Leeson's activities, an internal audit
report in Singapore did recognize the potential for abuse. The re-
port stated that "Mr [sic] Leeson occupied a very powerful position
controlling both the front and back offices of BFS. He was both
chief trader and head of settlements and was thus in a position to
record the trades that he himself had executed in any way he
wished."43
In the aftermath of the Barings Crisis, as regulators were trying
to determine the causes of the collapse, there appeared to be plenty
of blame to go around. First, in the private sector, the Baring
Group did little or nothing in the way of monitoring and regulat-
ing the activities of Leeson, an employee who was placed in a posi-
40 For an explanation of futures transactions, see Ross ET AL., supra note 19, at
705-10.
41 ScoTr & WELLONS, supra note 1, at 991.
42 See id. at 993 (providing financial figures detailing the gradual progression
of Leeson's undetected losses).
43 Id. at 994-95.
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tion of power, with the ability to control and edit the financial re-
cords that tracked his activities. Second, in the public sector, the
inability of auditors and regulators on the SIMEX and OSE stock
exchanges to detect any wrongdoing allowed Leeson to continue
his trading unencumbered.
One of the few positive notes that resulted from the Barings
Crisis was the effectiveness of the margin rules on SIMEX,44 which
protected some of the losses due to Leeson's trading. Margin rules
continue to be one of the major tools used by exchanges to protect
the safety and soundness of their institutions.45
As was the case in the BCCI collapse, there were attempts made
to change and tighten the regulations that failed to prevent the Bar-
ings Crisis. There was a change made in compliance audits of for-
eign-owned subsidiaries, wherein both the host and parent country
of the bank are to be held equally responsible for audits and sanc-
tions.46 The Windsor Declaration and the March 1996 Declaration
for Information Sharing took further regulatory steps forward.
The Windsor Declaration was the result of a May 1995 meeting
in Windsor, U.K., of representatives of the financial futures and op-
tions47 regulators from 16 countries around the globe.48 The key
topics of discussion, which became components of the Windsor
Declaration, included: the cooperation between market authorities;
protection of customer positions, funds and assets; default proce-
dures in the case of events like the Barings Crisis; and regulatory
cooperation in emergency situations.49
44 Id. at 996-1001 (describing the regulatory scheme of SIMEX, including gen-
eral surveillance and financial audits backed by fines of varying degrees).
45 Id. at 951-56 (providing details of the different forms of margin rules util-
ized for positions in stock, as well as specific forms of margin rules for trading fu-
tures and options contracts).
46 See Carolyn Currie, The Optimum Regulatory Model for the Next Millennium -
Lessons from International Comparisons and the Australian-Asian Experience, in TIlE
NEw FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE: BANKING REGULATION IN THE 21sr CENTURY 85, 100-
01 (Benton E. Gup ed., 2000) (discussing the range of models that can be designed
to regulate a financial system).
47 An option contract is an agreement that gives the owner of the option the
right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell a specific asset at a specific price for a
set period of time. For more information on options contracts and their place in
the international financial markets, see Ross ET AL., supra note 19, at 705-10.
48 Representatives at the Windsor conference included regulators from Aus-
tralia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, the Nether-
lands, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United States,
and the United Kingdom. SCOTT & WELLONS, supra note 1, at 1012.
49 Id. at 1013.
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About a year after the Windsor Declaration, the futures and op-
tions regulators continued their attempts to improve regulatory
standards by promulgating the Declaration on Cooperation and
Supervision of International Futures Markets and Clearing Organi-
zations.50 The idea was that authorities would share certain infor-
mation with one another, on a confidential basis, in the event that
the authorities became suspicious of the activities of a regulated
party. Procedurally, the agreement allowed an authority to make a
formal information request to another regulating authority if cer-
tain events occurred.5'
3.3. The Mexican Peso Crisis of 1994-1995
The Mexican Crisis of 1994-1995 is particularly important for a
number of reasons. First, the Mexican Crisis revolved around the
failure of a national economy rather than an individual bank or se-
curities firm, and its potential significance for future crises, in the
face of the increasingly interconnected international economy,
earned it the dubious honor of being dubbed "the first major crisis
of the 21st century."52 Second, the crisis in Mexico spread to a
number of other economies, with crippling consequences, a phe-
nomenon often called the "Tequila Effect."5 3 Third, the progress of
Mexico's economy, prior to the crisis, had been considered a very
successful venture; it had been held up as an example, a blueprint,
of how developing countries and emerging economies could reach
new prosperous heights.54 So, when it all came crashing down,
there was great worldwide interest in determining what went
wrong.
The factors that led to the crisis have since been analyzed, dis-
cussed, and debated repeatedly, in hopes of finding 'signs' of
forewarning that can be relied upon to avoid similar crises in the
5o The Declaration on Cooperation and Supervision of International Futures
Markets and Clearing Houses was promulgated in March of 1996. Id. at 1015.
51 See ScowT & WELLONS, supra note 1, at 1015-17 (discussing the efforts of fu-
tures and options regulators to open their lines of communication and informa-
tion sharing).
52 GRIFFrTH-JONES, supra note 33, at 100.
53 ScoTT & WELLONS, supra note 1, at 1291.
54 See GRIFFITH-JONES, supra note 33, at 104-15 (describing how initial eco-
nomic success spurred foreign investment and further fueled economic progress
and development).
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future.5 5 Alas, while opinions as to the major causes vary (as they
always do), there have been a number of factors credited for hav-
ing had at least some impact on the turn of events. These factors
include: the large current account deficit that Mexico had carried
into 1993 and 1994, which was close to eight percent of the gross
domestic product (GDP);56 the fact that much of the deficit was
funded by short-term capital inflows; 57 the Mexican commitment to
a relatively fixed exchange rate, even, and perhaps especially,
when the Mexican exchange rate seemed to be overvalued;58 the
fact that Mexico had allowed such a large portion of its govern-
ment debt paper to fall into the hands of non-residents; 9 and the
fact that a high proportion of the government debt paper was
short-term.60
Having identified some of the factors that played a role in the
Mexican Crisis, it is now essential to see if these factors can be util-
ized as indicators, or as 'advice' for better fiscal policy under simi-
lar circumstances. In order to do this, the following section of this
Comment will briefly discuss the way in which the crisis unfolded
and then examine how the situation may have been handled dif-
ferently.
On December 20, 1994, the Mexican government devalued the
peso fifteen percent against the dollar, and two days later it let the
peso float.61 At the time of the devaluation, many observers felt it
was the correct fiscal policy in light of the large current account
deficit and the exchange rate.62 However, many of the same ob-
servers believed that the action was taken too late.63 The Mexican
stock market index, which had been as high as 2600 at the start of
55 See generally Bradford DeLong et al., The Mexican Peso Crisis: In Defense of
U.S. Policy Toward Mexico (discussing U.S. economic policy toward Mexico and
debating whether this policy was a contributing factor of the Mexican Peso Crisis),
at http://www.j-bradford-delong.net/EconArticles/themexicanpesocrisis.html
(last visited Apr. 3, 2003).
56 GRIFFITH-JONES, supra note 33, at 100.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 SCOT & WELLONS, supra note 1, at 1257.
62 See GRIFFITH-JONES, supra note 33, at 124-26 (describing the massive finan-
cial crisis following the devaluation of the peso on December 20,1994).
63 Id.
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December, plummeted to below 1500 in 6arly March of 1995 before
it began to recover.64
Of even more significance, perhaps, was the effect of the Mexi-
can crisis on the rest of the world's economies:
Even though the Mexican authorities on 20 December did
what many observers had said was necessary (a devalua-
tion of around 20 per cent), this decision precipitated an in-
credibly large financial and balance of payments crisis for
Mexico, with strong ripple effects not just in Latin America,
but throughout the developing world and even in some of
the weaker developed economies. 65
Following the collapse in Mexico, other Latin American mar-
kets fell like dominoes. The major markets in Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, and Peru all fell from December through mid-March, when
they reached about sixty percent of their December levels.66 The
Asian exchanges were also impacted. During January of 1995,
there were declines of eleven to thirteen percent in Pakistan, the
Philippines, China, India, South Korea, and Taiwan. 67 Smaller de-
clines hit Hong Kong, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singa-
pore.68 The systemic risk that many people had feared was now
spreading throughout the world.
But what, if anything, did we take from this? Was there any-
thing to be learned about trends and warning signs, or could it all
be attributed to random chance and a combination of unfortunate
circumstances? At least one thing had become clear: governments
and economies which have been quickly elevated from an influx of
foreign investor funding are vulnerable to a situation where those
same foreign investors lose faith in the system and quickly with-
draw their funds.
This realization is supported by evidence of financial flows to
developing countries since the Mexican Crisis. In 1993, non-bank
private lenders and portfolio investors accounted for fifty-two per-
cent of external financing. By 1995, non-bank private lenders and
64 SCOTr & WELLONS, supra note 1, at 1257.
65 GRIFFITH-JONES, supra note 33, at 124.
66 ScoTr & WELLONS, supra note 1, at 1258.
67 Id.
68 Id.
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portfolio investors accounted for only sixteen percent of total ex-
ternal financing. 69
Of all the lessons learned from the Mexican Crisis, the most
important was that the international financial architecture had be-
come interconnected in a way such that systemic risk was now a
real threat that had to be dealt with.
3.4. The Asian Crisis
As the effects of the Mexican Peso Crisis were finally being
vanquished from both the markets and our minds, we were once
again reminded of the fragile state of the international financial
structure when the exchange rates in many countries in Asia col-
lapsed, starting yet another crisis.70
While the causes of a financial crisis are never easy to isolate
and point to, the causes of the Asian Crisis in particular were, and
remain, a hotly debated issue among economists and policymak-
ers.71 The severity of the crisis in Asia only served to make the de-
bate more important: "There had been at different times and in
different regions debt crises, currency crises, banking crises, and
stock market crashes. But at no other time had all four types of cri-
sis happened simultaneously." 72
Some pointed to market failure,73 or government failure74 in fis-
cal policy to explain the Asian Crisis. Still others blamed the crisis
on the inherent weaknesses and instability of the international fi-
nancial architecture. 75 While debate raged on over the cause of the
crisis, the impact of the crisis was visible to all. The crisis began in
mid-1997 in Thailand, and spread to Malaysia, the Philippines, In-
donesia, and Korea over a six-month time period.76 The crisis
served to place an entire region in a financial tailspin; the so-called
69 Id. at 1292.
70 See Edward K.Y. Chen, The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-8: A Case of Market
Failure, Government Failure, or International Failure?, in ESSAYS ON THE WORLD
ECONOMY AND ITS FINANCIAL SYSTEM 49, 49-63 (Brigitte Granville ed., 2000) (dis-
cussing the far-reaching effects of the Asian Financial Crisis).
71 See generally SCOrT & WELLONS, supra note 1, at 1293-94 (discussing differ-
ent viewpoints as to the cause of the Asian Financial Crisis).
72 Chen, supra note 70, at 49.
73 See id. at 50-51 (listing in detail the causes of the market failure).
74 Id. at 51-52.
75 Id. at 53-54.
76 SCOTT & WELLONS, supra note 1, at 1293.
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Asian Tigers that had been the toast of the international economic
community found themselves reeling, now hoping only to stop the
bleeding.
But the impact of the Asian Crisis was felt outside of the region
as well. "After the Asian Crisis hit, investors began to withdraw
from Russia, draining perhaps $5 billion in just one month, No-
vember 1997, for example." 77 This contributed to a Russian Crisis
wherein the country defaulted on government bonds.78
As occurred after the Mexico Crisis, the Asian Crisis sparked
debate about reforming the International Financial Architecture to
promote stability and prevent systemic risk.79 In a positive light,
the Asian Crisis once again focused our attention on the Interna-
tional Financial Architecture; shortly thereafter, the G7 created a
new International Group to help facilitate the coordination of In-
ternational Financial Standards: The.Financial Stability Forum.
4. THE FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM
We have seen in the case of the BCCI Bank Collapse and the
Barings Crisis that attempts to regulate international financial
transactions have not been completely effective. It is not hard to
see why: without a single set of financial rules and regulations,
banks and firms operating across borders are often dealing with
multiple sets of laws, and often are left to choose those that they
may find most beneficial.8 0 And when the regulatory oversight of
77 SCOTT & WELLONS, supra note 1, at 1299.
78 Id. at 1298-1301 (describing fully the Russian default on financial instru-
ments issues as part of an earlier debt restructuring). The huge withdrawal of for-
eign investor funds, coupled with already existing political instability and other
weak financial indicators, led to further investor outflows. The cost of servicing
Russian government debts increased, and this put pressure on the ruble, signaling
weakness in the economy that prevented any new inflows of foreign capital. Id.
79 See C.H. Kwan, Asia in Search of a New Exchange Rate Regime, in ESSAYS ON
THE WORLD ECONOMY AND rTs FINANCIAL SYSTEM 127 (Brigitte Granville ed., 2000)
(discussing various viewpoints regarding the best way to stabilize the interna-
tional financial architecture).
80 For example, in the case of the Barings Crisis, the Barings group decided to
move much of their futures trading and arbitrage activity from the Osaka Stock
Exchange to the Singapore Stock Exchange because of the lesser margin require-
ments, which allowed Barings to perform trades at lower costs, but did not pro-
vide as much of a buffer for safety and soundness precautions. See ScoTT &
WELLONS, supra note 1, at 985-95. See also supra § 3.2.
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these banks, firms, and other private actors are divided among
multiple regulatory bodies, there is a reduction in accountability.81
We have further seen, in the case of the Mexican Crisis and the
Asian Crisis, that our international financial system has become in-
creasingly interconnected. Under these circumstances, a fiscal cri-
sis in one country or in one region of the world can quickly spread
throughout the global economy. The lack of a single set of eco-
nomic regulations or principles, and the lack of a single authority
to regulate international economic activity, often leave countries
with only one recourse -to hope that those responsible for the fis-
cal policies of other nations are being responsible in their fiscal de-
cision-making.
As one might guess, this kind of blind faith in the fiscal regula-
tors of other economies does not sit well with many of the world's
policymakers. Instead, there has been a call for our international
financial bodies to try to create and maintain a more unified set of
standards in international financial regulation. This is often re-
ferred to as the call for a New International Financial Architec-
ture.82
One of the newest pieces of the international financial puzzle,
and an interesting step forward in the quest to create a more uni-
fied set of international financial standards, has arrived in the form
of the Financial Stability Forum.
4.1. Financial Stability Forum Background
Discussed earlier, the financial crises of the 1990s, particularly
the Mexican Crisis and the Asian Crisis, sparked great interest in
the idea of reforming the international financial architecture. One
such international body that became concerned with the possibility
of future crises was the G7.83 In acting on this interest, the G7 re-
quested that Hans Tietmeyer, the President of the Bundesbank,
prepare a report offering suggestions as to how closer cooperation
and coordination could be gained between the many international
81 This happened in the Barings Crisis when both the London group and the
Singapore group were responsible for Leeson's trading activities, and so both
groups were lax on monitoring him, because each felt the other would do the nec-
essary monitoring. See SCOTT & WELLONS, supra note 1, at 985-95.
82 See Lee C. Buchheit, A Lawyer's Perspective on the New International Financial
Architecture, in THE REFORM OF THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE 235,
237 (Rosa M. Lastra ed., 2001) (discussing the possible variations of a reformed
international economic regulatory infrastructure).
83 For a further description of the G7, see Walker, supra note 4, at 122 n.6.
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financial regulatory bodies and the existing international financial
institutions whose goal was to maintain international economic
stability.84
Upon completion of the report, Tietmeyer presented his find-
ings to the G7 at a 1999 meeting.85 In his report to the G7, Tiet-
meyer proposed the creation of a new institution, the Financial
Stability Forum, which would be comprised of: national authori-
ties responsible for financial stability in significant international fi-
nancial centers, namely treasuries, central banks, and supervisory
agencies; sector-specific international groupings of regulators and
supervisors engaged in developing standards and codes of good
practice; international financial institutions charged with surveil-
lance of domestic and international financial systems, and monitor-
ing and fostering implementation of standards; and committees of
central bank experts concerned with market infrastructure and
functioning. 86
The G7 approved Tietmeyer's proposal, and the Financial Sta-
bility Forum convened on April 14, 1999, with Andrew Crockett-
General Manager for the Bank of International Settlements
("BIS")87-appointed as chairman of the Forum for a period of
three years.88 Mr. Crockett's new Financial Stability Forum was
charged with a list of lofty objectives: to assess vulnerabilities af-
fecting the international financial system; to identify and oversee
action needed to address these vulnerabilities; and to improve co-
ordination and information exchange among the various authori-
ties responsible for financial stability.89
Another important issue regarding the Financial Stability Fo-
rum's organizational structure revolves around its membership
84 Id. at 124-25 (discussing Tietmeyer's appointment and the reasons for his
assignment).
85 See Hans Tietmeyer, Report on International Co-operation and Co-ordination in
the Area of Financial Market Supervision and Surveillance (Feb. 11, 1999) (introducing
the idea of the Financial Stability Forum to the G7).
86 See Financial Stability Forum, Objectives, supra note 18 (describing further
the envisioned roles of these members and the coordinating role of the Financial
Stability Forum).
87 For a description of the BIS and its place in the international financial ar-
chitecture, see James R. Barth et al., Commercial Banking Structure, Regulation and
Performance: An International Comparison, in MODERNIZING FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 119
(Dimitri B. Papadimitriou ed., 2000).
88 Financial Stability Forum, Home, supra note 16.
89 See Financial Stability Forum, Objectives, supra note 18 (discussing in more
detail these objectives and possible approaches to reaching these objectives).
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policies and procedures. First, the forty members of the Forum
bring together representatives of the G7 countries; international fi-
nancial institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, BIS, and the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
("OECD"), international regulatory and supervisory groups such
as the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, the IOSCO, and
the IAIS; and committees of central bank experts.90
The ability to bring together these various international regula-
tory and supervisory bodies allows the Financial Stability Forum to
act as a conduit, an instrument of information exchange and policy
formulation in a collaborative effort with the many separate inter-
national financial institutions. This organizational structure may
not seem extraordinary, but it creates the opportunity for a mean-
ingful forum in which a single set of international standards can be
discussed by a variety of interested parties.91
4.2. What's Right with the Financial Stability Forum?
Also discussed earlier, the Financial Stability Forum holds a
unique position as a global financial facilitator. Bringing together a
vast array of regulatory and supervisory groups to discuss, exam-
ine, and hopefully cooperate in the creation of uniform interna-
tional standards is indeed a great benefit of the organizational
structure of the Financial Stability Forum.
Another promising project at the Forum, and perhaps the most
impressive one to date, is the attempt to assemble a "Compendium
of Standards."92 According to the Financial Stability Forum web-
site:
The Compendium of Standards provides a common refer-
ence for the various economic and financial standards that
are internationally accepted as relevant to sound, stable and
well-functioning financial systems. It serves as a gateway
or point of entry for financial authorities and market par-
90 See Financial Stability Forum, Membership, supra note 17 (listing member
categories).
91 See Walker, supra note 4, at 152 (discussing the benefits of a cooperative fo-
rum in promoting international agreement and fostering future cooperative ef-
forts).
92 Financial Stability Forum, Compendium of Standards, at http://www.fs
forum.org/Standards/Home.html [hereinafter Financial Stability Forum, Stan-
dards] (last visited Jan. 1, 2002) (on file with author).
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ticipants to access the sites where the complete standards,
supporting documents, and assessment methodologies ref-
erenced in the standards are located. It also signals the im-
portance attached by the international community to the
implementation of these standards and sound practices,
and facilitate the dissemination of information on them.93
The Compendium of Standards set forth by the Financial Sta-
bility Forum, with the help and support of the member regulatory
and supervisory bodies, represents an initial step towards a con-
solidated international financial set of rules and regulations.94
While the compendium is a promising first attempt to create a uni-
fied set of international economic regulations, there is still much
work to be done in 'working out the kinks.'95 For instance, prob-
lems have been identified in the Compendium of Standards with
regard to gaps and internal consistencies.96
The Compendium of Standards seems to be the long-term goal
of the Financial Stability Forum; a functioning and controlling set
of international standards would represent a culmination of sorts
for the Forum's efforts. Still, the agreement upon and widespread
use of a single set of international financial standards may take
some time to accomplish.
In the meantime, the Financial Stability Forum has utilized its
'working groups' format to identify and address smaller, more
pressing problems in the international marketplace. By creating
smaller, more manageable groups to work on specific problems,
the Forum can take advantage of the vast experience and knowl-
edge of its membership without the need for initial agreement
among all forty members. The working groups investigate their
mandated issues, and then create reports to present to the entirety
93 Id. See also Reserve Bank of Australia, Financial System Architecture (dis-
cussing the Compendium of Standards and the Financial Stability Forum's strate-
gies to get the standards implemented, such as market incentives), available at
http://www.rba.gov.au/FinancialSystemStability/financiaLsystemarchitecture.
html (last visited Feb. 19, 2003).
94 See Walker, supra note 4, at 152 (describing the benefits of a system like the
Compendium of Standards in promoting global cooperation).
95 Id. at 151 (describing that the Compendium of Standards, while certainly a
meaningful step towards progress, remains far from perfect).
96 Id. (discussing in greater depth some of the identified shortfalls of the
Compendium of Standards and how those shortfalls may be addressed).
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of the Forum's membership, where any decisions can then be made
by the fully informed group.
Initially, three working groups were set up during the first
meeting of the Financial Stability Forum in 1999. These groups
were to investigate highly leveraged institutions, capital flows, and
offshore financial centers.97
The group on highly leveraged institutions was to "recommend
actions to reduce the destabilizing potential of institutions employ-
ing a high degree of leverage ("HLIs") in the financial markets of
developed and developing countries." 98 In order to accomplish
this goal, the group was to focus on "the potential risk to the finan-
cial system presented by the failure of large HLIs and the effects of
the activities of HLIs on the dynamics and integrity of financial
markets in small and medium-sized economies."
99
The group submitted its report to the Financial Stability Forum
in March 2000; the Forum endorsed the recommendations made in
the report.100
The Offshore Financial Centers ("OFCs") working group was
given the task of considering "the significance of offshore financial
centers for global financial stability." 101 In carrying out its man-
date, the group "reviewed the uses and activities of OFCs with a
view to addressing problems created by OFCs with weaknesses in
financial supervision, cross-border co-operation, and transparency
that allow financial market participants to engage in regulatory ar-
bitrage of several forms." 10 2
The OFCs group presented its report to the Forum in March
2000, which the Forum accepted and endorsed. 103
The working group on Capital Flows performed its mandated
task, and also presented its report to the Forum in March 2000,
which was accepted and endorsed.104
97 See Financial Stability Forum, Working Groups (detailing the assignments
of the working groups), at http://www.fsforum.org/About/WorkGroups.html
(last visited Jan. 11, 2002) (on file with author).
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 The actual report is available to the public on the Financial Stability Fo-
rum website at http://www.fsforum.org.
101 Financial Stability Forum, Working Groups, supra note 97.
102 Id.
103 The actual report is available to the public on the Financial Stability Fo-
rum website at http://www.fsforum.org.
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Following on the success of the initial three working groups,
the Forum has since established two more working groups: the
Task Force on Implementation Standards, and the Study Group on
Deposit Insurance. The working groups seem to be a very effective
format of operation for the Forum, and one that the Forum will
likely continue to utilize in the near future.
4.3. What's Wrong with the Financial Stability Forum?
The membership policies of the Financial Stability Forum,
while presenting a great opportunity due to the input from a wide
array of regulatory and supervisory agencies, also present a serious
problem. As previously discussed, the Forum is composed of a
number of international regulatory groups, and also representa-
tives from all of the G7 countries. 105
Examining these membership policies, a lack of participation
by lesser developed countries ("LDCs") and emerging economies
is quite evident. The Financial Stability Forum claims that the
membership policies will be expanded in time, one way or another:
Although direct membership was to be limited to the G7,
efforts have been made from an early stage to extend the
range of countries involved with its work. Senior represen-
tatives from Hong Kong, Australia and the Netherlands
were accordingly invited to attend the second meetings in
Paris while other countries will be involved through its
working group structures.10 6
While the Financial Stability Forum promises to expand par-
ticipation in the future, many of those countries and groups cur-
rently locked out of the meaningful progress are not satisfied:
104 The actual report is available to the public on the Financial Stability Fo-
rum website, at http://www.fsforum.org.
105 The G7 consists of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. Further discussion of the G7 and its member-
ship and policies can be found at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts
/groups.htm#G7.
10 Walker, supra note 4, at 129. To learn more about the utilization of work-
ing groups in the Financial Stability Forum, see Financial Stability Forum, Work-
ing Groups, supra note 97.
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A preemptive, pre-crisis credit line at the Fund (which no
country wants to avail of) and a toothless Financial Stability
Forum-where there is little developing country participa-
tion-appear to be the only "innovations" to emerge from
the Asian, Russian, and Brazilian financial crises of the last
three years.107
It seems counterintuitive that we would lock certain groups or
countries out of the discussions and policy formulation for the
New International Financial Architecture. Surely, as the world
economies will almost certainly continue to become even more co-
dependent, one would argue that even those countries which do
not currently reside in positions of economic prominence should
be able to offer their opinions, and help shape the future New In-
ternational Financial Architecture. 08
107 Walden Bello, Global Policy Forum Report, 2000: The Year of Global Protest
against Globalization, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/role/glob
dem/globprot/2001/03092000.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2003). See generally Gerry
Helleiner, Global Financial Governance Initiative, Developing Countries, Global Fi-
nancial Governance and the Group of Twenty: A Note (Mar. 2001) (presenting a note
prepared for the Governance Working Group of the Global Financial Governance
Initiative discussing the need for increased participation in the international eco-
nomic policy arena by countries outside the G7), available at
http://users.ox.ac.uk/-ntwoods/Helleiner%20on%20G20.PDF.
108 See generally Minister of Finance and Economy for the Republic of Korea
Jin Nyum, Strengthening the International Financial Architecture, Speech presented at
the Asia-Europe ("ASEM") Finance Ministers Meeting (Jan. 14, 2001), available at
http://www.mof.go.jp/english/asem/aseme03g2.htm.
I would like to draw your attention to the fact that main [sic] dialogues
for reform have been led by the G-7 countries. And, as such, views of
emerging countries have often been overlooked.
We must remember that the recent crises are not entirely due to the vul-
nerability that existed within the crisis-hit countries' own financial sys-
tems.
The shortcomings of the international financial system itself need be held
accountable as well. That is, its incapacity to adapt to new developments
in the world economy, especially the surge and the reversal of private
capital flows.
In order to avoid such a calamity, our goal must consist of more than just
strengthening [sic] domestic financial sector and implementing sound
macroeconomic policies. To fully rectify the structural impediments in
the international financial system, we need a much more unified effort,
in which we all continuously take part.
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When the goal is to create a single, unified body of interna-
tional financial regulations, how can we expect the countries that
do not participate to accept the new regulations, voluntarily or
otherwise? The fact of the matter is that these regulations cannot
be thrust upon unwilling parties; the Financial Stability Forum
runs the risk of creating a wonderful set of new standards that no
one will adopt 09 This issue was brought straight to the Chairman
of the Forum, Andrew Crockett, following a presentation to the
United Nations in May 2000:
After his speech, representatives of Southern governments
followed each other in raising queries and concerns. Kenya
began with a concern on the exclusion of African states,
particularly the LDCs, from membership in the FSF. The
woman representative from Cuba followed through by in-
forming the speaker of the declaration made by country
representatives at the South Forum (2000) of their refusal to
implement any international standard or measure arrived at
without their meaningful participation.1o
Mr. Crockett responded to the comments by voicing his opin-
ion that the Forum would be more efficient if membership and pol-
icy ideas were rather homogeneous.' But are homogeneous
membership and policy formulation valid goals, when the stan-
dards that will be promulgated by the Forum are expected to be
adopted globally?
109 See generally Alan Beattie, G24 Coalition Bristles at IMF Demands, FIN.
TIMES.COM, Sept. 25,2000 ("A coalition of developing and emerging market coun-
tries has attacked the idea that they should be compelled to adhere to interna-
tional standards of fiscal and monetary policy."), available at http://news.ft.com.
110 Gigi Francisco, From Global Negotiators to Global Regulators: Which Way Eco-
nomic Globalization?, available at www.dawn.org.fj/global/restructuring/wssd/
globaLneg.html (last visited Feb. 20,2003) (emphasis added).
M Mr. Crockett responded to the question:
In defense of exclusivity of membership in the FSF to industrialized and
some key emerging economies, he opined: "We need to focus on best
practice, not average practice." Still very much preoccupied with nothing
but dealing with 'best' practices and solutions, he threw a challenge to
the body by asking how expansion in membership could be undertaken
without creating a demand for everyone-including those with average
and bad practices - to also want to join.
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We find a good example of this egocentrism in practice if we
look at the Financial Stability Forum Report on Offshore Financial
Centres.112 The aim of the report was to identify the most effective
international standards which could secure proper financial super-
vision, cross-border cooperation, and transparency 13 with respect
to the offshore centers." 4
The report classified the offshore financial centers into three
groups, each group defined by a certain lack of regulatory effec-
tiveness. The Bermuda International Business Association
("BIBA") questioned the rankings, and its placement in the tier II
group.115 BIBA, and several other financial centers placed on the
list, fear that the countries conducting these reports are doing so
partly out of a fear of the competition provided by the offshore
centers.116
In many countries, the offshore financial centers represent a
significant part of the economy. Why would these countries sub-
mit to any suggestions proposed by the Financial Stability Forum?
The Forum is effectively planning to cut off these countries' eco-
nomic flows without inviting them to help create the standards by
which they will be judged.
5. CONCLUSION
As we have seen, the international financial community is be-
coming more interconnected and interdependent every day.117
While this creates increased financial opportunities for market
players, and may serve to equalize some of the economic inequity
in our international system, it also opens us up to the dangers of
112 Financial Stability Forum Working Group on Offshore Financial Centres,
Report on Offshore Financial Centres (discussing the problems associated with these
offshore financial centers, and the best ways to bring these centers under more
strict financial rules), available at http://www.fsforum.org (last visited Feb. 20,
2003).
113 For a definition of transparency rules, see SCOri & WELLONS, supra note 1,
at 1360.
114 See Walker, supra note 4, at 133 (discussing the reasons why the Financial
Stability Forum might target these offshore financial centers).
115 Ross Webber, BIBA Queries Negative Offshore Centre Rating (June 6,
2000), available at http://www.biba.org/newspub/story.cfm?ID=51.
116 Id. I I
117 See Bryant, supra note 13, at 218 (discussing reasons why the global
economies are likely to continue their growing interdependence).
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systemic risk, and threatens the safety and soundness of the Inter-
national Financial Architecture.
The BCCI Collapse,118 the Barings Crisis,119 and the crises in
Mexico 20 and Asia' 2' serve to illustrate the difficulties inherently
involved in regulating an international financial system where
multiple sets of rules and numerous supervisory bodies exist. It
seems that we might all be better off with a single set of interna-
tional financial regulations.
The Financial Stability Forum represents a preliminary step in
this direction, and its Compendium of Standards' 22 sets the bar for
future achievements at a very high level indeed. Unfortunately,
the progress that has been made by the Financial Stability Forum
thus far has been tempered by the restrictions on participation
which seem to threaten the Forum's ultimate goals. Only by open-
ing membership to a wider group of countries, and allowing all
countries to participate on some meaningful level, will the Finan-
cial Stability Forum eventually be able to establish a single set of
international financial standards that will limit global systemic in-
stability and be embraced by all.
118 A full discussion of the BCCI banking collapse is available at SCOTT &
WELLONS, supra note 1, at 113. See also supra § 3.1.
119 For a more detailed discussion of the Barings Crisis, see Scorr & WELLONS,
supra note 1, at 985. See also supra § 3.2.
120 For a more in-depth look at the causes and effects of the Mexico Crisis, see
GRIFFITH-JONES, supra note 33, at 100. See also supra § 3.3.
121 For a fully-detailed discussion of the debate over the causes of the Asian
Crisis, see Chen, supra note 70. See also supra § 3.4.
122 Financial Stability Forum, Standards, supra note 92.
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